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The New Resident Evil? State Regulation of Violent 
Video Games and the First Amendment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The game’s premise is simple: the player controls an escaped 
convict named James Earl Cash as he fights for his life through the 
gritty streets of a fictional American city. In doing so, players of the 
hit video game, Manhunt, first released in 2003, are immersed in a 
detailed, interactive world, offering a wide range of possibilities to 
the creative gamer. In the game, Cash is enlisted as the protagonist 
in a series of snuff films by “the Director,” who is eerily omnipresent 
due to his use of strategically positioned video cameras and an 
earpiece. The Director’s mandate: kill or be killed. To carry out the 
Director’s bidding, Cash has at his disposal a variety of deadly 
options. Cash can kill other characters “by suffocating them with a 
plastic bag, slicing them up with a chainsaw, shooting them point 
blank with a nail gun, stabbing them in the eyeballs with a glass 
shard, or beheading them with a cleaver,” among other methods.1 
The more grisly the killing, the more points players earn. All the 
while, the Director eggs the player on—emphasizing the need to 
please his waiting audiences and the Director’s own sexual 
gratification.2 
While games like Manhunt have grown enormously popular 
among both children and adults,3 these games have increasingly 
drawn the ire of state regulators over the past two decades. 
Numerous states and political subdivisions have passed legislation 
seeking to restrict minors’ access to violent video games.4 Many 
 
 1. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 2008) (excerpting 
a number of descriptions of violent video games advanced by the state as justification for state 
regulation). 
 2. Id. (“The Director makes comments such as ‘You’re really getting me off, Cash’ and 
‘You’re really doing it for me! Why I ain’t been this turned on since . . . Well, let’s not go 
there.’ The game has two difficulty settings: fetish and hardcore.”). 
 3. Ilana Lubin, Note, Challenging Standard Conceptions of Tradition, Science and 
Technology in 2006: Why Laws Prohibiting the Sale of Violent Video Games to Minors Should Be 
Ultimately Upheld, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 173, 173 (2006) (describing the popularity 
and magnitude of the video game industry and the rise of children owning violent games). 
 4. Among these are California, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
Washington, the city of Indianapolis and St. Louis County, Missouri. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 
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other political bodies have either attempted to enact such legislation 
or are currently attempting to do so.5 Without exception, each 
legislative effort has met staunch opposition from a broad coalition 
of gamers, industry leaders, and First Amendment advocates. Federal 
courts have responded by invalidating, on First Amendment 
grounds, any state effort to restrict minors’ access to video games 
based on violent content alone.6 
Federal appellate courts grappled with the constitutional 
implications of violent video game regulation for ten years before the 
Supreme Court took up the issue. In 2011, the Court decided 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,7 upholding a Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision that invalidated a California law 
prohibiting the sale of violent games to minors. Although Brown did 
clarify some ambiguities in the law created by the various lower court 
decisions, this Comment identifies two fundamental questions that 
 
1746–1746.5 (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 967 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d by Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12A & 5/12B (West Supp. 2011), 
declared unconstitutional by Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 
2006); 2006 La. Acts 1815–17, declared unconstitutional by Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 
451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006), repealed by 2008 La. Acts 1421; 2005 Mich. Pub. Acts 
336–42, declared unconstitutional by Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 
646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); MINN. STAT. § 325I.06 (Supp. 2010), declared unconstitutional by 
Swanson, 519 F.3d 768; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1040.75–77 (2002 & Supp. 2010), declared 
unconstitutional by Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097 
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.91.180 (2010), declared unconstitutional 
by Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004); ST. 
LOUIS CNTY., MO., ORDINANCE NO. 20,193 (Oct. 26, 2000), declared unconstitutional by 
Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); 
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., GENERAL ORDINANCE 72 (2000), declared unconstitutional by Am. 
Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Renee Newman 
Knake, From Research Conclusions to Real Change: Understanding the First Amendment’s 
(Non)Response to the Negative Effects of Media on Children by Looking to the Example of Violent 
Video Game Regulations, 63 SMU L. REV. 1197, 1219 (2010). 
 5. For example, in 2009, the Utah legislature passed a bill that would have penalized 
video game retailers and movie theaters that allowed minors access to games or films rated 
above their age level. Although the bill passed by a wide margin, it was ultimately vetoed by 
then-Governor Jon Huntsman. See Jeffrey O’Holleran, Note, Blood Code: The History and 
Future of Video Game Censorship, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 571, 593 (2010) 
(citing Mike Fahey, Utah Governor Smacks Down Thompson Bill, KOTAKU (Mar. 26, 2009, 
10:00 AM), http://kotaku.com/5185169/Utah-governor-smacks-down-thompson-bill). 
 6. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950; Swanson, 519 F.3d 768; Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641; 
Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d 954; Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572; Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823; 
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646; Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180; Wilson v. Midway Games, 
Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 7. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
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remain unanswered: First, will a video game (or similar form of 
interactive media) ever receive anything less than strict First 
Amendment scrutiny? Second, will a state ever meet its burden under 
the strict scrutiny standard? This Comment argues that although 
Brown does not squarely address either question, Brown and prior 
lower court decisions demonstrate that both questions must be 
answered in the negative. By focusing on the theoretical 
underpinnings of violent video game regulation, this piece brings a 
fresh look to the two questions above, which underlie an extensive, 
cross-disciplinary debate that has raged for over ten years. This 
Comment critiques many of the arguments advanced by jurists and 
scholars—most of which find voice in the various opinions in 
Brown—to demonstrate that prevailing constitutional norms leave 
virtually no room for regulation of violent video games. 
Accordingly, Part II proceeds by offering a brief background of 
video game regulation and its interplay with the First Amendment. 
Part III discusses the first question identified above. At first blush, 
Brown appears to answer the question as to whether regulation of 
violent video games will ever be afforded less then strict scrutiny. 
However, Part III underlines arguable differences between video 
games and other media, some of which are discussed in Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion in Brown. Ultimately, this Part concludes, 
however, that none of these differences are likely to persuade the 
Court to afford video games less rigorous First Amendment 
protection, regardless of how realistic or interactive they are or 
become.  
Part IV then takes up the second question identified above, 
whether a state could ever meet its burden under strict scrutiny. It 
concludes that future attempts to regulate minors’ access to violent 
video games are likely to meet the same fate as the California law 
invalidated in Brown for three reasons. First, proponents of state 
regulation have blurred the normative line between harm to children 
and content offensiveness, and (unnecessarily) ceded the rhetorical 
upper ground to regulation opponents. Second, although ongoing 
scientific research is likely to continue to support a causal link 
between violent video games and harm to children, judicial inertia 
will likely bar any future finding of sufficient evidence to satisfy strict 
scrutiny. Third, the nature of the states’ proffered regulatory 
rationale—harm to children—makes statutes addressing that harm 
particularly vulnerable to under- or over-inclusiveness. Thus, despite 
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the states’ measured approach to regulating minors’ access to violent 
video games, Brown demonstrates that future state regulatory 
attempts are likely doomed, even if the state can sufficiently prove 
that violent video games cause harm to minors. Part V briefly 
concludes.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In many First Amendment cases, parties asserting First 
Amendment rights face a threshold question of whether, and to what 
extent, the alleged speech is actually protected.8 Once full protection 
is recognized, however, content-based restrictions9 on speech must 
survive strict scrutiny.10 For a statute to withstand strict scrutiny, the 
government must prove that a regulation is “narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest.”11 Although First 
Amendment litigation over video game regulation in federal courts is 
a relatively recent development,12 the state of the law is well-settled. 
The Supreme Court and every prior federal court that has considered 
the issue, with only a few exceptions, has held that video games 
enjoy full First Amendment protection, and that state efforts to 
regulate them must therefore survive strict scrutiny.13 Accordingly, 
 
 8. See, e.g, Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008) (summarizing 
the employee speech doctrine enunciated in prior Supreme Court decisions by noting “the 
First Amendment protects public-employee speech only when it falls within the core of First 
Amendment protection—speech on matters of public concern”); see also Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 
2733–34 (devoting significant discussion to whether, and to what extent, video games are 
protected by the First Amendment); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 200 
F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (upholding constitutionality of county ordinance 
restricting minors’ video game access because “plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing 
that video games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment”). 
 9. Federal courts, even prior to Brown, uniformly held that state efforts to single out 
violent video games as a target for regulation amounted to content-based restrictions. In fact, 
California did not even challenge this assumption at the appellate level. Schwarzenegger, 556 
F.3d at 958 (“It is . . . undisputed that the Act seeks to restrict expression in video games 
based on its [sic] content.”); see also Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 646 (recognizing State’s 
concession that the challenged regulation is content-based). 
 10. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
 11. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 646 (quoting Playboy Entm’t, 529 U.S. at 813) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 12. In 2001, a federal appellate court addressed for the first time First Amendment 
issues in video game regulation. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
 13. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733–34. Interactive Digital, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, and 
American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000), are 
the only two “recent” federal court opinions that diverge from this otherwise uniform 
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each of the video game cases centers around three essential points of 
divergence between state regulators and the gaming industry.14 This 
Part identifies these issues in turn and demonstrates that the courts 
have sided overwhelmingly with the gaming industry on each.  
A. Violent Video Games Are Fully Protected Speech Under the First 
Amendment 
For several years, state regulators championed the argument that 
their regulations need not pass strict scrutiny because video games 
are not protected expression in the first place. Notwithstanding the 
rich history of First Amendment protection for other forms of 
media,15 protection for video games was initially open to debate. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never precisely articulated a 
test for determining whether a given form of expression is 
constitutionally protected.16 As one district court judge explained: 
“‘Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First 
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present 
its own problems.’ Any given form of entertainment, activity, or 
interaction may or may not be protected under the First 
Amendment.”17 Although this variability might seem like good news 
 
conclusion. Both cases upheld the state’s right to regulate based on their conclusion that video 
games do not enjoy full First Amendment protection. See Interactive, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 
(holding that video games are not protected speech under the First Amendment); Kendrick, 
115 F. Supp. 2d at 954, 975 (recognizing that “at least some games are protected by the First 
Amendment,” but concluding that the First Amendment affords lesser protection to violent 
video games when those games are accessible to minors). Both Interactive Digital and 
Kendrick were reversed by their respective appellate courts. See Interactive Digital Software 
Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572. 
 14. But see Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958 (“The State does not contest that video 
games are a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[E]xpression 
by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 
131, 166 (1948) (“We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are 
included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); Lovell v. 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and 
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.”). 
 16. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179 (D. Conn. 2002); 
Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 952. 
 17. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 952 (quoting Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546, 557 (1975)). Although the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s Kendrick 
opinion, Judge Posner implicitly left this proposition intact by spending the major portion of 
his opinion discussing why he thought video games constitute protected speech. Kendrick, 244 
F.3d at 574–79. 
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to state regulators, Brown makes clear that even statutes regulating 
novel forms of expression will be subject to strict scrutiny, unless 
they fall into traditionally recognized exceptions.18 
States have generally advanced two categories of arguments for 
why video games should enjoy less than full First Amendment 
protection.19 Both avenues were rejected by the Brown Court and 
were rejected by most federal courts even prior to Brown. First, states 
have argued that the Constitution permits restriction of minors’ 
access to offensive materials to a degree that it would never permit 
for adults. This argument flows naturally from the concept of 
“variable obscenity” adopted by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. 
New York.20 Simply put, the variable obscenity doctrine holds that 
certain expression could be considered obscenity when experienced 
by a minor, even though that expression would not rise to the level 
of obscenity when experienced by an adult.21 States have advanced a 
broad reading of Ginsberg that would fit extreme violent video game 
content under the variable obscenity umbrella.22 However, Judge 
Posner set the stage for widespread judicial rejection of this variable 
obscenity argument by narrowly construing Ginsberg. According to 
Judge Posner, Ginsberg stands only for the proposition that 
“potential harm to children’s ethical and psychological development 
is a permissible ground for trying to shield them from forms of 
sexual expression that fall short of obscenity.”23 In this vein, Judge 
Posner and, later, the Brown majority have declined states’ 
invitations to read Ginsberg as expanding obscenity beyond its 
traditional regulation of sexual materials, even where only minors’ 
 
 18. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733–34. 
 19. Some states have also argued that violent video game statutes should not be subject 
to strict scrutiny because their aim is to prevent violent, aggressive, or antisocial behavior. 
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002). Courts have quickly 
discounted this rationale by applying Brandenburg v. Ohio, which holds that incitement to 
violence is unprotected, but only in certain circumstances. See, e.g., id. Under Brandenburg, 
“states may only regulate that speech which is ‘directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.’” Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)); see also Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 182 (dismissing tort 
complaint in part on First Amendment grounds because plaintiffs did not allege that the video 
game urged imminent lawless action and it was not likely to produce such action). 
 20. 390 U.S. 629, 635 n.4 (1968). 
 21. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958–59 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
 22. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574. 
 23. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
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access is restricted.24 Because violence is not sex, goes the argument, 
it is not obscenity.25 
The second main strategy states use to argue that video games 
are not protected expression is simply to distinguish video games 
from traditionally protected forms of media. States have typically 
done this by stressing the interactivity of video games.26 However, 
courts have uniformly rejected any state attempts to set video games 
apart, instead concluding that modern video games are “analytically 
indistinguishable from other protected media, such as motion 
pictures or books, which convey information or evoke emotions by 
imagery, [and] are protected by the First Amendment.”27 
B. No Regulatory Body Has Been Able to Show a Compelling 
Government Interest 
Because video games are protected expression, a state’s 
regulatory interest must be compelling to withstand strict scrutiny.28 
States have commonly advanced two rationales for violent video 
 
 24. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733–34 (2011) (“Because 
speech about violence is not obscene, it is of no consequence that California’s statute mimics 
the New York statute regulating obscenity-for-minors that we upheld in Ginsberg v. New 
York.”); Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 576; see also Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 960 (“In light of our 
reading of Ginsberg and the cases from our sister circuits, we decline the State’s invitation to 
apply the Ginsberg rationale to material depicting violence . . . .”). 
 25. Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 
2003) (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992)) 
(“Simply put, depictions of violence cannot fall within the legal definition of obscenity for 
either minors or adults.”); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(“As we understand James’s complaint, he complains that the video games and the movie are 
excessively violent—yet we have generally applied our obscenity jurisprudence only to material 
of a sexual nature . . . . We decline to extend our obscenity jurisprudence to violent, instead of 
sexually explicit, material.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (D. La. 2006) 
(“The State contends that a video game is different from all other forms of media because it 
provides visual, auditory and other sensory feelings of feedback and encouragement, etc., when 
the viewer complies with instructions to do violence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 27. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002); see also 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737–38; Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 958 (“[Video games] are as 
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.” (quoting Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 28. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738; Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 
646 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he [regulation] is a content-based restriction on speech, and we 
must employ strict scrutiny in assessing its constitutionality.”); Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 
958 (“Because the ordinance regulates video games based on their content (the ordinance 
applies only to ‘graphically violent’ video games), we review it according to a strict scrutiny 
standard.”). 
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game restriction: “(1) preventing violent, aggressive, and antisocial 
behavior; and (2) preventing psychological or neurological harm to 
minors who play violent video games.”29  
The first regulatory rationale has not received very much 
attention from the courts, and has been unhelpful when advanced by 
regulation proponents.30 By contrast, the second regulatory 
rationale—preventing direct psychological harm to underage video 
game players—has featured prominently in judicial discussion.31 At 
the outset, most courts are willing to acknowledge that preventing 
harm to minors is a compelling state interest, at least in the 
abstract.32 However, beyond mere recitation of a compelling interest, 
the government bears the burden to “demonstrate that the recited 
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in 
fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”33  
As a result, the compelling government interest analysis of this 
issue requires courts to parse large amounts of psychological research 
supporting either side.34 While courts vary widely in the degree of 
credit they grant the states’ scientific evidence,35 almost all have 
 
 29. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961. 
 30. See supra note 19 (discussing the Brandenburg test). 
 31. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737–39; Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961–64 
(resolving the Brandenburg incitement issue in a single footnote, but devoting significant 
discussion to the direct harm issue). 
 32. See Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 958; see also Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 961; 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 33. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 962 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 963–64. 
 35. Consider, for example the wide divergence of court opinion, regarding the State’s 
evidence supporting a Minnesota statue, between appellate stages of the same case. In Swanson, 
519 F.3d at 772, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded “that the State’s evidence 
provides substantial support for its contention that violent video games have a deleterious 
effect upon the psychological well-being of minors.” By contrast, a Minnesota district court 
had previously stated:  
This Court’s review of the [research] reveals it to be completely insufficient to 
demonstrate an empirical, causal link between video games and violence in minors. . 
. . The State itself acknowledges both in its submissions and during its counsel’s oral 
argument, that it is entirely incapable of showing a causal link between the playing 
of video games and any deleterious effect on the psychological, moral, or ethical 
well-being of minors. 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069–70 (D. Minn. 2006). Both 
courts’ conclusions rested primarily on a 2004 study by Dr. Craig Anderson. Swanson, 519 
F.3d at 70–71; Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. Dr. Anderson’s meta-analysis revealed a 
significant link between violent video games and “increases in aggressive behavior, aggressive 
cognition, aggressive affect, and cardiovascular arousal, and to decreases in helping behavior.” 
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viewed it with great skepticism.36 Because research into the 
psychological effects of video games on minors is still in its infant 
stages,37 much of the same material has been repeatedly recycled by 
different regulatory bodies to support their aims.38 Although a 
thorough analysis of the available research is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, it is enough to note here that there is persuasive science 
on both sides of the “psychological harm rationale,”39 as 
demonstrated by the vigorous advocacy on both sides of the issue, 
each purporting to rest on a scientific foundation.40 Accordingly, the 
problem for the state is simply one of proof, and no state has 
successfully carried its burden.41 
C. No Regulatory Body Has Been Able to Show that Their Proffered 
Regulation Is the Least Restrictive Means to Address the Stated Interest 
Although judicial resolution of the compelling government 
interest prong probably obviates the least restrictive means analysis,42 
several courts have resolved this issue in the video game regulation 
 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963. However, the study also revealed several weaknesses in the 
body of violent video game literature, including flaws in past studies and the lack of 
longitudinal studies. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097, 
at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007) (“There is no support in the record, let alone ‘substantial 
evidence,’ for Defendants’ conclusion that allowing dissemination of violent video games to 
minors is harmful to those minors or any others.”) (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2004)). 
 37. See infra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
 38. Some courts’ treatment of this evidence raises the question of whether courts in the 
later decisions even seriously considered it. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. 
Supp. 2d 823, 832 (M.D. La. 2006) (“It appears that much of the same evidence has been 
considered by numerous courts and in each case the connection was found to be tenuous and 
speculative.”). 
 39. See also Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 963 (discussing “psychological harm rationale” 
and the link, or lack thereof, between violent video games); compare Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737–38 (2011) (calling California’s proffered evidence of harm to 
children “ambiguous”), with Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing 
numerous authorities supporting a causal link between violent video games and harm to 
minors). 
 40. Lubin, supra note 3, at 189–92. 
 41. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964. 
 42. See Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958–59 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (resolving the strict scrutiny analysis without inquiring whether the St. Louis 
ordinance was the least restrictive means to accomplish the county’s stated regulatory purpose). 
But see Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 965 (conducting the least restrictive means inquiry despite 
concluding that the State failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest). 
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context.43 Essentially, this prong of the strict scrutiny analysis 
requires that a statute be narrowly tailored to address the alleged 
psychological harm to minors caused by violent video games.44 For a 
regulation to survive, regulators must demonstrate “why less 
restrictive means would not forward [their regulatory] interests.”45 
Thus, a state may not focus merely on the “most effective” means of 
combating the regulated evil.46 Because courts have easily 
hypothesized a number of less restrictive regulatory methods,47 they 
have been universally unsympathetic to state regulatory attempts.48  
Further, the requirement that a proposed statute be “narrowly 
tailored” implicates the method and restrictive scope of proposed 
legislation. Video game statutes struck down by courts have fallen 
along a broad spectrum of “restrictiveness”—from forbidding minors 
from playing in video arcades without their parents,49 to simply 
requiring consent of a parent or guardian for someone to rent, sell, 
or otherwise make available a violent video game to a minor.50 
Nevertheless, courts have broadly rejected states’ proposed solutions, 
often finding them either overinclusive, thereby needlessly restricting 
protected expression,51 or underinclusive, thereby failing to 
adequately address the precise problems that serve as the state’s 
rationale.52 
 
 43. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740–41; Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 965; Foti, 451 
F. Supp. 2d 823; Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 646, 654 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004). 
 44. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964–65. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740–41; see also infra Part IV.C. 
 48. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740–42; Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 965. 
 49. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 50. Interactive Digital Software v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 51. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 52. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740–41 (characterizing the California statute as both “wildly 
underinclusive” and “vastly overinclusive”); Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that violent video games are less prevalent and often less violent than movies, but 
movies were not addressed in the City’s ordinance); Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, No. CIV-
06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097 at *6–7 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. 
Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 
F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (M.D. La. 2006). 
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III. QUESTION ONE: WILL REGULATION OF A VIOLENT VIDEO 
GAME EVER RECEIVE LESS THAN STRICT SCRUTINY? 
As demonstrated above, courts have consistently rejected 
legislative efforts to produce constitutionally sound video game 
regulation. In doing so, courts have largely refused to draw 
distinctions between video games and other forms of protected 
speech. Further, even where a distinction is recognized, opinions 
vary as to whether that distinction is constitutionally significant.53 As 
it stands now, Brown has made clear that violent video games enjoy 
protection equal to that of any other form of media.54 This Part 
argues that although there is at least a colorable difference between 
violent video games and other forms of violent media, Brown 
forecloses the possibility that video games regulation might receive 
less than strict scrutiny. While it is unclear how far Brown’s 
conclusion will extend to new media forms, this Part ultimately 
concludes that regulation proponents will likely fail to persuade 
courts to apply less-rigid scrutiny, regardless of how realistic or 
interactive video games may become. 
A. Violent Video Games Distinguished from Other Forms of Protected 
Speech 
Violent video games differ from other modes of protected speech 
in at least two important ways. First, regulation proponents argue 
that video games have the potential to portray violence in far more 
extreme and visceral ways than books or even movies. Second, and 
more importantly, video games are far more interactive than other 
media forms. The Brown majority rejected both attempts to 
distinguish video games from other forms of protected media.55 
However, each difference warrants further analysis to determine 
whether there is room for evolution in judicial thinking as new 
technologies are developed. 
 
 53. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737 n.4. 
 54. Id. at 2737–38. 
 55. Id. 
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1. A video game’s ability to transmit content realistically and viscerally 
is not a sound constitutional basis for distinction and will not become so 
as technology further develops.  
Regulation proponents commonly include descriptions, and even 
multimedia demonstrations, of violent video games in their briefing 
and courtroom advocacy.56 To the extent that these descriptions are 
offered to establish background and context for state regulation, they 
are useful. To the extent that these descriptions are offered to argue 
that the statutes should withstand strict scrutiny, they are ineffective 
and counterproductive. To argue that video games are particularly 
effective in transmitting violent ideas, a party must assume that they 
transmit ideas. Accordingly, to argue that they should be barred on 
this basis is to argue that minors’ access to violent ideas should be 
barred. Thus, any attempt to do so subjects a statute to automatic 
judicial skepticism,57 if not First Amendment panic.58 
This phenomenon is well illustrated by Brown. Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion hones in on several examples of video games in 
which “the violence is astounding.”59 He references games wherein 
“[v]ictims by the dozens are killed with every imaginable 
implement,” and games inviting players to “reenact the killings 
carried out by the perpetrators of the murders at Columbine High 
School and Virginia Tech.”60 Justice Alito draws from these examples 
the relatively modest conclusion that the majority acted prematurely 
in broadly dismissing the possibility that video games might be 
distinguishable from other forms of more passive media.61 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, writing for the Brown majority, quickly 
seizes on Justice Alito’s proffered examples as illustrating the very 
reason that violent video games should enjoy First Amendment 
protection.62 He writes: “[I]ronically, Justice Alito’s argument 
 
 56. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 2008); 
Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577. 
 57. This phenomenon is illustrated throughout the federal appellate history of violent 
video game regulation. For example, it prompted Judge Posner to invoke “[t]he murderous 
fanaticism displayed by young German soldiers in World War II” to illustrate the potential 
harm that results from seeking to control children’s exposure to ideas. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 
576–77. 
 58. See infra Part IV.A. 
 59. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2749 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 2749–50. 
 61. Id. at 2751. 
 62. Id. at 2738 (majority opinion). 
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highlights the precise danger posed by the California Act: that the 
ideas expressed by speech—whether it be violence, or gore, or 
racism—and not its objective effects, may be the real reason for 
governmental proscription.”63 There is no better illustration of how 
quickly courts discount states’ “harm to minors” rationale once the 
specter of censorship appears.64 
On a theoretical level, the argument that video games are 
different than other media based on their realism and gore will not 
get better with age. Although, as Justice Alito notes,65 video games 
are increasingly realistic, Justice Scalia’s conclusion regarding the 
dangers of suppressing ideas is probably inescapable, even as new 
technology develops. Nothing about the idea of spattering blood 
changes when a new simulator allows the player to one day feel the 
blood spatter rather than merely see it splatter (an example used by 
Justice Alito).66 The message from the video game developer to the 
minor does not change. Thus, Brown probably signals the Supreme 
Court death knell of this argument going forward, just as surely as it 
does for similar arguments regarding today’s graphics technologies.  
2. Interactivity is a more persuasive basis for constitutional distinction 
and will likely be even more so in the future.  
It is unclear to what extent Justice Alito actually fell into the 
realistic/visceral trap discussed above. After all, the examples he 
presents are used to illustrate a more important and more persuasive 
point: video games are interactive to a degree unknown to other 
forms of media.67 Even before Brown, however, any effort to 
distinguish video games based on their interactivity faced an uphill 
battle because courts were, apparently universally, convinced that 
“‘violent’ video games contain stories, imagery, ‘age-old themes of 
literature,’ and messages, ‘even an ideology,’” to the same extent as 
books and movies.68 Although Brown was no exception to this 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2749 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2751. 
 68. Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 
2003) (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577–78 (7th Cir. 
2001)). 
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monolithic view,69 a brief overview of judicial thinking on this 
subject and close analysis lend credence to Justice Alito’s position 
that the Brown majority might have been too quick to dismiss any 
possibility of a constitutionally significant distinction. This is likely to 
be even more true as technology continues to develop. 
a. Overview of judicial views on constitutional significance of 
interactivity. Although a widely disfavored view today, several early 
courts held that video games were not entitled to First Amendment 
protection at all.70 Beginning with Amusement Machine Association 
v. Kendrick in 2001, however, video games’ superficial resemblance 
to other forms of media, among other things,71 led courts to swing 
the pendulum in the complete opposite direction. Since that time, 
courts have hastily dismissed states’ efforts to distinguish video 
games based on interactivity.72  
Nevertheless, judicial reasoning for supporting the 
literature/movies/video game analogy ranges from the 
questionable-but-plausible, to the downright erroneous. Judge 
Posner’s Kendrick opinion offered the most commonly cited 
rationale for treating video games and other media the same.73 He 
argues:  
 
 69. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737–38 (majority opinion). 
 70. See supra note 8. The first federal case to address video games’ status under the First 
Amendment was America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 
170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Analyzing the extent to which the Constitution protected video game 
arcades from restrictive zoning ordinances, the district court found that “although video game 
programs may be copyrighted, they ‘contain so little in the way of particularized form of 
expression’ that video games cannot be fairly characterized as a form of speech protected by 
the First Amendment.” Id. at 174 (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 
(2d Cir. 1982)). The court reasoned that “a video game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, 
or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no informational element. That some of 
these games ‘talk’ to the participant, play music, or have written instructions does not provide 
the missing element of ‘information.’” Id. This view has been expressly rejected in the more 
recent line of video game cases. See Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 957 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has long emphasized that the first amendment protects entertainment, as well as political 
and ideological speech, and that a particularized message is not required for speech to be 
constitutionally protected.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 71. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 72. See, e.g., Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 957–58; Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577; 
Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179–81 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 73. See, e.g., Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 957; Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Chi. Transit 
Auth., 696 F. Supp. 2d 934, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 
F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 180. 
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All literature . . . is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive. 
Literature when it is successful draws the reader into the story, 
makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge them 
and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the 
reader’s own. 74 
 The Brown majority cites this very passage in dismissing 
California’s argument that “video games present special problems 
because they are interactive.”75 Although Judge Posner and Justice 
Scalia ignore the common-sense distinction between passive, 
imaginative interaction and direct, player-driven participation,76 some 
elements of video games evoke emotions in similar ways as do movies 
or other media. But it requires more than a logical baby step to 
conclude that books and movies are equally as interactive as video 
games.  
Yet, this is what some courts attempted to do pre-Brown. For 
example, consider Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis 
County, which, after Kendrick, was the next federal appellate 
decision to squarely address a proposed governmental regulation of 
video games.77 In supporting its decision to extend full constitutional 
protection to violent video games, the court reasoned: 
[S]ome books, such as the pre-teen oriented “Choose Your Own 
Nightmare” series (in which the reader makes choices that 
determine the plot of the story, and which lead the reader to one of 
several endings, by following the instructions at the bottom of the 
page) can be every bit as interactive as video games.78 
The Interactive Digital court then attempted to analogize the video-
game player’s ability to control the flow of the expressive content to 
the movie viewer’s ability to control expressive content by virtue of a 
 
 74. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577.  
 75. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 76. Justice Alito alluded to this passive/active distinction in arguing that at least some 
video games or interactive media could be distinguishable from books and movies. Id. at 2750 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 77. Although James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2002), did 
analyze First Amendment protection of video games, it was not in the context of state 
regulatory efforts. Rather, James raised First Amendment concerns with extending tort liability 
to video game makers for harm caused by game players allegedly influenced by the games’ 
violent content. Id. 
 78. Interactive Digital, 329 F.3d at 957–58. 
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“videocassette or DVD player.”79 Because “increased viewer control 
does not render movies unprotected by the first amendment, . . . 
equivalent player control likewise should not automatically disqualify 
modern video games.”80 Justice Scalia, in Brown, sidesteps this 
logical leap of faith. Although he invokes the example of choose-
your-own-adventure stories, Justice Scalia correctly points out that 
the difference between a video game and a choose-your-own-
adventure book is one of degree, not of kind.81  
In doing so, Justice Scalia frames the issue at the heart of First 
Amendment protection: the speaker’s message to the listener (or the 
player). It is easy to see how a video game with “characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music” could arguably contain an expressive 
message to the same extent as a book.82 After all, for a player to 
advance levels and ultimately reach the end of a game, the player 
must pass through content written by the game programmers. 
However, as discussed below, the players, rather than the 
programmers, increasingly control the content of the message.  
B. Although Video Games’ Interactivity May Increasingly Make Their 
Expressive Message Different in Kind from Other Media, the Difference 
Will Likely Have Little Effect on Judicial Scrutiny 
Kendrick, Interactive Digital, and, most recently, Brown, 
discount too quickly the wide range of game-play opportunities 
available to modern gamers. Regulators and commentators alike have 
persuasively argued that video games offer a level of player control 
unappreciated by the Kendrick line of cases.83 That level of control 
allows video games to have a different impact on players than more 
passive media forms. As one student author noted, “when one 
empathizes with a character in a book or movie, one does not 
control the character’s actions or bear the consequences that result. 
Instead, as an observer, one has the ability to intellectualize the 
actions committed by the characters.”84 Courts have generally 
glossed over “control” as a constitutionally insignificant difference 
 
 79. Id. at 957. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (majority opinion). 
 82. Id. at 2733. 
 83. Lubin, supra note 3, at 182. 
 84. Id. at 181. 
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between movies and video games with little supporting reasoning.85 
However, in addition to Brown, some federal court opinions, such as 
Kendrick, at least directly attempted to address the constitutional 
significance of player control.86 Kendrick cites the lack of “evidence 
that violent video games are any more harmful” than “other violent, 
but passive,” forms of media as justification for protecting violent 
video games.87 After all, the court reasons: 
When Dirty Harry or some other avenging hero kills off a string of 
villains, the audience is expected to identify with him, to revel in his 
success, to feel their own finger on the trigger. It is conceivable 
that pushing a button or manipulating a toggle stick engenders an 
even deeper surge of aggressive joy, but of that there is no evidence 
at all.88 
Nevertheless, there is increasing scientific evidence that video games’ 
interactivity does cause greater impact to the player than a more 
passive form of participation required to enjoy a book or movie.89 
Accordingly, the question is not whether there will ever be evidence 
of a difference in kind between video games and other media, but 
whether there will be enough evidence of a difference and whether 
courts will deem that difference constitutionally significant. 
Beyond the control distinction, video game players’ ever-
increasing range of choice distinguishes video games from other 
protected media. Federal courts have seldom even alluded to new, 
flexible game formats that turn players loose in an interactive world 
with a fully equipped digital agent at their fingertips.90 The Brown 
 
 85. Courts seem content to overcome the interactivity distinction based on Judge 
Posner’s definition of interactivity. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 
572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 
(M.D. La. 2006).  
 86. See, e.g., Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 578–79. 
 87. Id. at 579.  
 88. Id; accord Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006).  
 89. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2769 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing DONALD E. COOK ET AL., JOINT STATEMENTS ON THE IMPACT OF 
ENTERTAINMENT VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN, CONGRESSIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH SUMMIT 
(July 26, 2000), available at http://www.aap.org/advocacy/releases/jstmtevc.htm 
[hereinafter JOINT STATEMENTS] (pointing to interactivity as a key feature in explaining the 
impact video games have on children)). 
 90. But see Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (“With the rapid advancements of video 
game technology and new innovations, such as online gaming, video games are becoming 
more open ended with more possibilities to interact with other players and control the fate of 
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majority is no exception to this lack of attention, as Justice Alito’s 
opinion points out.91 Consider the Postal video game series, which 
drew the ire of parents and politicians for its creatively gory content 
including “urinating on people to make them vomit in disgust . . . 
and playing fetch with dogs using human heads,” among others.92 
The player, through “Postal Dude,” has an assortment of tasks that 
may be performed in any order and require (often violent) 
interactions with various non-player characters (“NPCs”).93 In a 
recent interview, Vince Desi, creator of the series, touted the makers’ 
efforts to improve the NPCs’ artificial intelligence for the third 
installment in the series “to make [their] characters truly living 
individuals.”94 With these new improvements, “not only will the 
[Postal] Dude be all about freedom of choice, but so will general 
pedestrians, and other key celebrity characters.”95 The open world 
and freedom of choice offered by games like the Postal series often 
leads to widely divergent gaming experiences.96 This variety sharply 
contrasts the fixed content in movies and the internet, as noted by 
Vince Desi and Postal III creative director, Steve Wilk.97 When asked 
how Postal creators were changing game features between Postal II 
and Postal III, Desi stressed the game’s interactive features. He 
stated, “It’s all about the Gameplay. I like movies as much as anyone, 
 
the characters and the worlds they inhabit.”). 
 91. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2750 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 92. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 93. Postal 3 First Impression Interview, VG CORE (Feb. 15, 2006), http:// 
xbox360.vgcore.com/interviews/10.html. 
 94. Postal III, Interview with Running with Scissors, OMG PC GAMES (May 3, 2008), 
http://omgpcgames.com/index.php/interviews/45-postal-iii-interview-with-running-with-
scissors (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Postal is not the only series or game that emphasizes an open and flexible 
environment. For example, World of Warcraft offers its eleven million players an unparalleled 
world of freedom of choice and movement. Christina H, 6 Ways World of Warcraft is Worse 
Than Real Life, CRACKED.COM (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.cracked.com/article_16782_6-
ways-world-warcraft-worse-than-real-life.html. Although fantasy-based, World of Warcraft is 
open enough that its universe is prone to random events of the sort that make the real world 
news every day, including scandals, political protests, and uncontrollable epidemics. See id. 
(describing an adulterous affair between two Chinese players that became a major political 
controversy in China, eventually leading to in-game protests and a mass, in-game suicide); 
Virtual Game is a ‘Disease Model’, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/ 
6951918.stm (last updated Aug. 21, 2007) (describing how virologists are studying players’ 
reactions to the “Corrupted Blood” disease, affecting characters on various World of Warcraft 
servers, to better understand how to control real-world disease outbreaks). 
 97. Postal 3 First Impression Interview, supra note 93.  
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but I’d rather watch ‘em on a big screen.”98 Wilk responded to a later 
question about violence in video games by noting: 
We created a reactive environment where the player has some tasks 
to complete. How the tasks are completed is entirely up to the 
player. Just like in the real world, weapons exist, but how they are 
used is left up to the judgement [sic] of the individual wielding 
it. . . .  
So the unfortunate situation for us is that what offends people is 
the concept of a game where you have free will and can choose, if 
you have that particular bent, to attack innocent bystanders.99  
However, as discussed above, this difference in the players’ ability 
to control a character is constitutionally insignificant, a matter of 
degree only, unless it brings a difference to the video game’s 
expressive message. Courts have rightly pointed out that movies and 
books evoke (if not display) violent content and themes to the same 
extent as video games.100 The Eighth Circuit even pointed out that 
“a good deal of the Bible portrays scenes of violence.”101 However, 
nothing that readers can do will allow them to change the story so 
that David cuts off Goliath’s head with a chainsaw instead of 
Goliath’s own sword.102 Certainly the reader might imagine that 
Goliath met a more gruesome fate than provided in the biblical 
account, but such passive, intellectual interaction is a world apart 
from the id-stroking, player-driven feedback available from video 
games like Manhunt and Postal 2.103 This interactivity distinction 
raises the crucial yet unanswered question of how player participation 
affects the constitutional burden on game makers when states restrict 
 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting the descriptions of violence in literary classics such as the Odyssey and War and Peace). 
 101. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 102. See 1 Samuel 17:51 (King James). 
 103. But see Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 182 (D. Conn. 2002) 
(calling games like Mortal Kombat III “gratuitously violent cross[es] between a comic book 
and a Saturday morning cartoon, with the player having some control over the sequence of 
events and choice of weapon-wielding characters”). The problems with this analogy hardly 
require rebuttal. There is not a comic book published that offers the variety of user choice 
available in games like Mortal Kombat in terms of character selection, fighting style, and visual 
feedback in response to user preferences. Also, if pressed, the court would likely be unable to 
name a Saturday morning cartoon that gave the young watcher the choice between killing 
opponents by kicking their throats versus simply tearing out their spines.  
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minors’ access to their games. Courts freely tout the rights of game 
makers to transmit storyline, imagery, and even ideology through the 
video game medium.104 Yet, even Brown fell short of fully addressing 
the type of hybridized, cooperative interaction between the gamer 
and the game whereby a large portion of the maker’s time is 
devoted, not to expression or a plot, but to the provision of tools to 
equip the player’s digital agent.105 In regulating violent video games, 
the focus of states and courts should not be on what the player 
learns, sees, or thinks, but rather on what the player chooses and 
does,106 taking into account the effect of gamers’ actions on a game’s 
expressive message.107 This focus would allow underage players’ own 
 
 104. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 957 
(8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577–78). 
 105. But see Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 181 (D. Conn. 2002) (arguing that interactivity 
simply enhances the expressive and artistic elements of violent video games). While it is true 
that interactivity allows a video game player to access varying expressive content depending on 
the player’s decisions, interaction also demands affirmative choice and participation by the 
player to a greater degree than any form of protected media. This raises the specter of the age 
old question about a tree falling in the woods. Phrased to match the video game context: if a 
video game maker engages in constitutionally protected expression and there is no player to 
access it through participatory cooperation, is it pure expression? Of course speech always 
requires a hearer and a book requires a reader. But, passive access to fixed conduct is 
analytically distinct from affirmatively imposing the player’s free will on a digital agent. 
 106. Regulatory bodies have asked courts to parse a video game’s expressive elements 
from the player-controlled portion. Courts have, understandably, been unwilling. See, e.g., 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“It would 
be impossible to separate the functional aspects of a video game from the expressive, inasmuch 
as they are they are so closely intertwined and dependant on each other in creating the virtual 
experience.”); see also Nathan Phillips, Note, Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis 
County: The First Amendment and Minors’ Access to Violent Video Games, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 585, 600 (2004) (“[I]t is becoming increasingly difficult to separate out the unadulterated 
gaming element within video games.”). Although Granholm used this to justify extending full 
protection to violent video games, it could just as easily be used to justify no protection of 
violent video games.  
 107. This argument is distinct from the early arguments that games are not protected 
because of the lack of information or ideas being communicated. See, e.g., Am.’s Best Family 
Showplace Corp. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Bldgs., 536 F. Supp. 170, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Nor 
should video game playing be considered the player’s “pure” conduct that implicates no 
expressive rights of the game maker. This was persuasively refuted even by the earliest 
commentators. See, e.g., David B. Goroff, Note, The First Amendment Side Effects of Curing 
Pac-Man Fever, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 744, 757–58 (1984). Rather, game makers’ expressive 
rights simply deserve less protection due to the portion of control over the message that they 
have ceded to the game players. Two of the justices, diverging from the majority in Brown, 
seem to make such an argument. For example, Justice Breyer, in dissent, while maintaining 
that video games deserve full protection, seems to argue that interactivity should make courts 
more sympathetic to states’ efforts to meet their strict scrutiny burden. Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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choice and participation to provide a theoretical basis for regulation 
that is not present in other forms of protected media.  
Although Brown forecloses this argument for now, there is some 
chance that the argument could win favor as technology continues to 
develop. Currently, most video games (including Manhunt, which is 
discussed in the Introduction), for all their player choice, still follow 
a relatively fixed format. A player proceeds through levels and 
eventually “beats” the game. However, as gaming formats become 
increasingly open and the Internet allows developers to create and 
populate digital worlds, state regulators will likely persist in their 
efforts to regulate the new frontier. Even now, online games allow 
players to assume identities and take a proprietary interest in their 
characters.108  
However, regardless of how “nonexpressive” video games 
become, it is difficult to see how violence could ever be regulated. 
Courts have been unwilling to parse the nonexpressive elements of a 
game from the expressive ones.109 Though perhaps less justified, 
courts are likely to be equally unwilling, even if all that remains of 
the programmers’ expression are the characters, weapons, music, and 
landscape and almost no storyline is presented. Accordingly, Brown 
demonstrates that even attempts to regulate the newest, most 
conduct oriented forms of media will likely prompt strict scrutiny. 
IV. QUESTION TWO: WILL A STATUTE AIMED AT RESTRICTING 
MINORS’ ACCESS TO VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES EVER PASS STRICT 
SCRUTINY? 
As demonstrated above, state attempts to distinguish violent 
video games from other forms of protected media have done nothing 
to tip the policy scales in favor of state regulation. Nor are courts 
willing to relax the demands of strict scrutiny where the statutes 
address only minors’ access to videogames.110 Although strict 
 
 108. See supra note 96.  
 109. See supra note 106. 
 110. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (majority opinion) (“‘[M]inors are entitled 
to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-
defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to 
them.’” (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1975) (citation omitted)). 
Nevertheless, courts are quick to give lip service to parents and state regulators’ general 
conclusions that many violent video games are not “suitable” for children. See, e.g., Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097, at *3 (D. Okla. Sept. 17, 
2007); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1188 (W.D. Wash. 
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scrutiny is very often the judicial death knell for state regulatory 
efforts,111 several nuances of violent video game regulation make 
strict scrutiny an especially difficult hurdle. Some of these context-
specific obstacles inhere in the statutes themselves and the nature of 
the medium. Other obstacles are the result of counterproductive 
advocacy offered by regulation proponents. This Part identifies three 
reasons that future state attempts to craft violent-video game 
regulations will be unlikely to pass strict scrutiny. 
A. Regulation Advocates Have Blurred the Theoretical Basis for 
Regulation, Provoking Judicial Skepticism of State Regulatory Efforts. 
One of the arguments consistently used by both state regulators 
and commentators in defense of state regulatory efforts is that 
violent video games should fall under the concept of “variable 
obscenity,” and be afforded less than strict scrutiny as a result.112 Not 
only has this argument failed to gain any traction in the federal 
courts,113 the argument is theoretically counterproductive. Simply 
put, obscenity law’s theoretical justification is different than the 
rationale states use to justify video game regulation.  
As Judge Posner noted in Kendrick, “The main worry about 
obscenity . . . is not that it is harmful, which is the worry behind the 
[city’s] ordinance, but that it is offensive.”114 This distinction works 
well for courts and advocates refuting states’ variable obscenity 
arguments because no state has openly advanced “offensiveness” as 
 
2004) (“That is not to say that the video games presented to the Court are unobjectionable. 
To the contrary, many of them promote hateful stereotypes and portray levels of violence and 
degradation that are repulsive.”).  
 111. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). 
 112. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 
2009) (acknowledging the state’s argument that Ginsberg should be read to allow states to 
prohibit sales of violent video games to children where it would be unconstitutional if aimed 
toward adults), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); 
Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 958, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(same); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(same); Lubin, supra note 3, at 176–79, 195. 
 113. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 957–61. But see Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. 
Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 975 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (concluding that video games enjoy less 
than First Amendment protection because they are obscene as to minors). The Indiana district 
court was expressly reversed on this point by Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574–75. 
 114. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 574. 
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their regulatory rationale.115 Further, Kendrick and subsequent cases 
make clear that if a state did attempt to regulate violent video games 
because they are offensive, such a normative argument would overlap 
with the obscenity doctrine.116 Because obscenity deals only with sex-
related materials, such an argument advanced in support of the 
regulation of violent video games justifiably fails, as Justice Scalia was 
quick to point out in Brown.117 Thus, states are left with two equally 
unappealing options regarding variable obscenity: stick with the 
psychological harm rationale and fail on theory (because the 
regulatory rationale is harm and not offense), or try to argue that 
violence is offensive and fail under the obscenity case law (because 
violence is not sex). 
This Morton’s Fork sheds light on the repeated attempts of 
regulators and commentators to urge courts to read Ginsberg to 
encompass non-sexual material.  Indeed, Ginsberg uses broad 
language to restrict minors’ access to previously nonobscene 
materials—sparking hope in the minds of state regulators.  For 
example, the Ginsberg Court noted “that even where there is an 
invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the 
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over 
adults.’”118 Read in conjunction with other cases in a variety of 
contexts,119 such broad language could be read to encompass even 
nonsexual materials.  Were that the case, Ginsberg would leave some 
room for states to regulate children’s access to violent video games 
for purely paternalistic reasons.120 
 
 115. See, e.g., id. at 575. 
 116. See id. at 574 (“A work is classified as obscene not upon proof that it is likely to 
affect anyone’s conduct, but upon proof that it violates community norms regarding the 
permissible scope of depictions of sexual or sex-related activity.”). 
 117. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. This has happened repeatedly. See supra note 25 and 
accompanying text. 
 118. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). 
 119. Consider Justice Powell’s language in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell offered three justifications for modifying constitutional 
protections where the rights of minors were implicated: “the peculiar vulnerability of children; 
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of 
the parental role in child rearing.” Id. at 634. Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Powell noted 
that “the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting minors on the basis of their 
lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice,” while simultaneously recognizing that some 
protection is afforded under Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637 n.15. 
 120. This is especially true when the majority opinion is read in light of Justice Stewart’s 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1682 
Although Ginsberg’s general pronouncements on state power 
might seem to lend policy support to states’ regulation of violent 
video games,121 any legislative hope it might have kindled died with 
Brown. The Brown court recognized, as had other courts before it, 
that Ginsberg’s holding could not withstand the twisting required to 
support state regulation of minors’ access to violent video games.122 
The Ginsberg court itself acknowledged that its decision did not 
define “the impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression upon 
the totality of the relationship of the minor and the State.”123 Rather, 
the court restricted its inquiry to whether it was unconstitutional for 
the New York statute in question “to accord minors under 17 a 
more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and 
determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see.”124 
As such, because courts have honed in on the restrictive, rather than 
the expansive language in Ginsberg, that case has ultimately proven 
unhelpful to state regulatory efforts. 
At the same time, there is a more invidious danger in trying to 
cast violent video games as “variable obscenity” than merely wasted 
space in appellate briefs. Proponents of state regulatory efforts have 
unwisely conflated the harm and offense rationales by arguing that 
violent video games are obscene. The stark theoretical contrast 
 
concurring opinion. To Justice Stewart, when a person distributes offensive material to 
children, that activity is akin to “foisting his uninvited views upon the members of a captive 
audience.” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring). A state can deprive a child of 
rights that it could not deny adults because “a child—like someone in a captive audience—is 
not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First 
Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 649–50. Although this patriarchal view is somewhat 
outmoded in defense of regulating “offensive” materials, it is attractive to state regulators 
looking for theoretical justification for the harm rationale undergirding video game regulation. 
 121. At least one court has expressly rejected a general appeal to Ginsberg’s broad 
“harmful to minors” language to create a category based solely on the alleged harm caused by 
the restricted activity. In Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. 
Wash. 2004), the district court concluded: 
The statute at issue in Ginsberg did not create an entirely new category of 
unprotected speech: rather, it adjusted the Roth definition of obscene material to 
capture that which is of sexual interest to minors. Defendants have not identified, 
and the Court has not found, any case in which a category of otherwise protected 
expression is kept from children because it might do them harm. 
Id. at 1186. 
 122. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735 (“Because speech about violence is not obscene, it is of 
no consequence that California’s statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity-for-
minors that we upheld in Ginsberg v. New York . . . .”). 
 123. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636. 
 124. Id. at 637 (emphasis added). 
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between obscenity and the harms associated with violent media 
provides an important rhetorical tool for distinguishing video game 
regulation from past legislative efforts to regulate other forms of 
media. This conflation blurs the line between modern, measured 
regulatory efforts and the over-the-top censorship that fomented 
much of the 20th century obscenity litigation. Although “First 
Amendment panic” is obviously not a stated judicial rationale for 
invalidating video game regulation, it seems clear that states’ variable 
obscenity arguments have triggered a judicial skepticism that has 
colored the video game cases from Kendrick to Brown.125 Insofar as 
states and commentators have argued that violent video games are 
variable obscenity, they have needlessly ceded the normative upper 
ground to regulation opponents.  As a result, it is all too easy for 
regulation opponents to label the harm rationale a pretext, a 
scientific canard advanced to obscure morality-driven legislative 
goals.  As such, states have unwittingly armed their regulatory 
opponents and fueled the (arguably unwarranted) judicial skepticism 
of state regulatory efforts that has colored and will continue to color 
future state attempts to pass strict scrutiny. 
B. The Required Quantum of Proof Remains Unclear and Judicial 
Inertia Will Likely Doom Future State Efforts to Show a Compelling 
Government Interest. 
Brown, like many lower court decisions before it,126 squarely held 
that the state did not meet its burden to show a compelling 
 
 125. A number of court opinions contain a large section of discussion of the dangers of 
government efforts to control children’s thoughts. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing why a state’s interest in 
controlling minors’ thoughts is not legitimate), aff’d sub nom. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729; Am. 
Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The murderous 
fanaticism displayed by young German soldiers in World War II, alumni of the Hitler Jugend, 
illustrates the danger of allowing government to control the access of children to information 
and opinion.”). This dicta demonstrates either that states were unclear about the regulatory 
basis for their respective statutes, or that the courts simply believed that offense, rather than 
psychological harm, was really at the core of state regulatory efforts. 
 126. See, e.g., Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577. Although Kendrick was the seminal pre-Brown 
case analyzing violent video game regulation, it contained surprisingly little discussion, much 
less authority, on what exactly the regulators have to prove to satisfy strict scrutiny. This may 
be simply because Kendrick was the earliest case on modern video games and the issues were 
not yet crystallized. The city apparently argued in Kendrick that violent video games “are 
dangerous to public safety.” Id. at 578. The Kendrick court quickly dismissed this argument 
because the social science studies proffered by the city did not establish that “video games have 
ever caused anyone to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused 
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government interest based on psychological harm to minors.127 
Future state regulatory efforts will likely face at least two context-
specific problems in attempts to pass strict scrutiny. First, nuances of 
child psychology and the courts’ insistence on direct proof of harm 
to minors will likely continue to prove an insurmountable obstacle. 
Second, continued judicial rejection of numerous studies showing 
both correlation and causation between harm to minors and violent 
video games makes it apparent that courts simply are not on board 
with the current body of research. Judicial inertia will likely require 
some sort of “smoking gun,” or numerous studies over several years, 
before states will be able to prove a compelling interest in regulation. 
1. States must show direct harm to minors. 
Since Kendrick, courts have required proof that video games 
directly cause psychological harm to minors.128 Correlation is not 
enough.129 For example, Brown stated that “[t]he State must 
specifically identify an ‘actual problem’ in need of solving, and the 
curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the 
solution.”130  
Pre-Brown decisions, however, probably go further than Brown 
did in describing what type of proof the courts would require. Those 
courts almost universally quoted language from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission.131 In Turner, the Supreme Court held 
that a federal law violated the First Amendment where it required 
cable companies to reserve a certain number of their channels for use 
by “local commercial television stations.”132 Writing for a plurality of 
 
the average level of violence to increase anywhere.” Id. at 578–79. According to Judge Posner, 
the city in Kendrick did not even argue that the addition of violent video games to other types 
of violent media “increases whatever dangers media depictions of violence pose to healthy 
character formation or peaceable, law-abiding behavior.” Id. at 579. 
 127. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (“The State’s evidence is not compelling.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069–70 (D. 
Minn. 2006) (resolving the compelling government interest prong against the state because of 
its inability to demonstrate a “causal link between the playing of video games and any 
deleterious effect on the psychological, moral, or ethical well-being of minors”). 
 129. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739; Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 964 (noting that a 
number of studies, though demonstrating correlation, failed to establish causation). 
 130. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (internal citations omitted). 
 131. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 132. Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:28 PM 
1659 The New Resident Evil? 
 1685 
the court, Justice Kennedy rejected the government’s argument that 
the “must-carry” provisions were necessary to preserve the health of 
broadcast television.133 He reasoned:  
When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means 
to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more 
than simply “posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.” 
It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms 
in a direct and material way.134 
Following from this language, state regulators face context-
specific problems in meeting the causation requirement. First, 
Turner itself did not clarify how much proof would actually be 
required. In Turner, the government offered only one statistical 
study showing that broadcast stations had been dropped from cable 
programming.135 It simply offered no evidence that broadcasters 
would suffer serious financial difficulty without the must-carry 
provisions.136 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s language, quoted 
above, aptly describes the government’s case in Turner because the 
government’s claims were actually “conjectural.” By contrast, states 
litigating the video game cases have offered large amounts of 
persuasive evidence of harm to minors, not just that minors were 
actually playing video games.137 Thus, it remains unclear how much 
 
 133. Id. at 664–68. 
 134. Id. at 664 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 135. Id. at 666–67. 
 136. Id. at 667 (“We think it significant, for instance, that the parties have not presented 
any evidence that local broadcast stations have fallen into bankruptcy, turned in their broadcast 
licenses, curtailed their broadcast operations, or suffered a serious reduction in operating 
revenues as a result of their being dropped from, or otherwise disadvantaged by, cable 
systems.”). 
 137. The same statute invalidated in Turner was reconsidered by the Supreme Court in 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v. Federal Communications Commission (Turner II), 520 U.S. 
180 (1997). After the first Turner case was remanded, the “District Court oversaw another 18 
months of factual development . . . ‘yielding a record of tens of thousands of pages’ of 
evidence.” Id. at 187 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 910 F. Supp. 
734, 755 (D.D.C. 1995)). On this enormous quantum of evidence, the Supreme Court had 
“no difficulty in finding a substantial basis to support Congress’ conclusion that a real threat 
justified enactment of the must-carry provisions.” Id. at 196. However, a later Supreme Court 
decision, United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000), addressed the 
quantum of proof needed to demonstrate a genuine problem in need of a regulatory solution. 
Noting the lack of government evidence of such a problem, the Court stated, “This is not to 
suggest that a 10,000 page record must be compiled in every case or that the Government 
must delay in acting to address a real problem; but the Government must present more than 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1686 
more evidence a court would require to show proof of harm 
causation. 
The second reason that video game regulators will have an even 
harder time proving harm to minors than the government had in 
showing direct harm in Turner inheres in the nuances of child 
psychology. Clearly, it is a much easier proposition to prove 
economic harm to the broadcast industry than to prove the 
psychological well-being of minors.138 Simply put, the nuances of 
child psychology are distinct from the more measureable health of 
individual businesses.139 Thus, because courts scrutinizing video 
game regulation cannot “abdicate” their important role in protecting 
important rights,140 the subtleties of youth psychological studies will 
likely continue to make direct proof of actual harm difficult going 
forward. 
2. Although Brown clarified the burden of proof, it remains unclear 
how much proof will be required to support a compelling government 
interest and whether judicial inertia will ever accept it.  
Brown clarified the burden of proof required to show a 
compelling government interest, clearing up some apparent lower 
court confusion. Once again, Turner is an important starting point 
in considering the appropriate standard of proof in the video game 
cases. Although the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower 
court’s upholding the must-carry provisions in Turner,141 the Justices 
sharply diverged in their reasoning.142 While Justice Kennedy 
 
anecdote and supposition.” Id. at 822. Many courts analyzing the video game issue have seized 
on the “anecdote and supposition language” from Playboy Entertainment to reason that states 
have insufficiently proved psychological harm to minors. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software 
Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 822 (8th Cir. 2003). Playboy Entertainment actually 
cuts against regulation opponents, however, because it at least implies that the evidence offered 
in Turner II (all 10,000 pages worth) was overkill, even in a strict scrutiny case.  
 138. Cf. Turner, 512 U.S. at 664–65.  
 139. See Lubin, supra note 3, at 189–90 (describing several recent studies revealing a 
dynamic and evolving understanding of the adolescent brain). 
 140. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 671 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 141. Id. at 668 (plurality opinion). 
 142. As to the reasoning behind the result, Justice Kennedy did not give the opinion of 
the court. Id. at 622. In fact, Justice Stevens joined in the result only grudgingly. See id. at 674 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“It is thus my view that we should affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. Were I to vote to affirm, however, no disposition of this appeal would 
command the support of a majority of the Court. An accommodation is therefore necessary.” 
(citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result)). 
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acknowledged that “courts must accord substantial deference to the 
predictive judgments of Congress,”143 he concluded that the 
government had not met its burden.144 Justice Stevens would have 
upheld Congress’s judgment that continued vitality in the broadcast 
industry required the must-carry provisions, despite the 
government’s failure to provide direct evidence of harm to 
broadcasters.145 Although Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens 
disagreed on how much evidence the government actually needed to 
carry its burden, both agreed that the standard of proof was whether 
Congress had “drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial 
evidence.”146 Prior to Brown, lower federal courts adopted different 
standards for the burden of proof the government must carry in the 
violent-video game context. Several cases had adopted the Turner 
standard, evaluating whether the statute was based on reasonable 
inferences based on substantial evidence. Another federal court had 
stated that a statute could not be upheld in the absence of 
“incontrovertible proof” that violent video games caused harm to 
minors.147 Brown made clear, however, that applying the standard 
articulated in Turner was error. Justice Scalia, for the majority, 
wrote: 
[T]he State claims that it need not produce [direct] proof because 
the legislature can make a predictive judgment that such a link 
exists, based on competing psychological studies. But reliance on 
Turner Broadcasting is misplaced. That decision applied 
intermediate scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation. California’s 
burden is much higher, and because it bears the risk of uncertainty, 
ambiguous proof will not suffice.148  
The problem now faced by regulation proponents, as discussed 
above, is to what extent any future court will credit the growing 
body of research demonstrating a causal link between violent video 
games and psychological harm to minors. 
 
 143. Turner, 512 U.S. at 665 (plurality opinion) (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973)). 
 144. Id. at 665–68. The result in Turner was a remand to the district court to allow the 
parties to further develop the evidence supporting their respective positions.  Id. at 668. 
 145. See id. at 670 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 146. Id. at 670 n.1. 
 147. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 148. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738–39 (2011). 
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Justice Breyer, dissenting from the Court’s decision in Brown, 
believes that states have already produced a sufficient body of 
research to demonstrate a compelling government interest.149 
Supporting his position, Justice Breyer noted: “There are many 
scientific studies that support California’s views. Social scientists, for 
example, have found causal evidence that playing these games results 
in harm.”150 Justice Breyer also pointed to various statements by 
medical associations including a joint statement made in 2000 by six 
American medical groups151 that announced a definitive link between 
media violence and youth aggression.152 The statement conceded 
that “less research has been done on the impact of violent interactive 
entertainment (video games and other interactive media)” on 
children.153 However, the statement did note that “preliminary 
studies indicate that the negative impact may be significantly more 
severe than that wrought by television, movies, or music.”154 
Although reasonable minds may differ as to the conclusiveness of 
the existing research, the real problem facing regulation proponents 
is the increasing judicial inertia demonstrated by the cases leading up 
to Brown. This inertia stems from judicial skepticism and a 
dissatisfaction with the body of research offered by states. Ironically, 
the cause of this dissatisfaction may trace back to the states 
themselves. Essentially, the states inadvertently put the regulatory 
cart before the scientific horse. The infant state of psychological 
research specifically addressing violent video games cannot bear the 
weight of judicial scrutiny—yet.155 This is especially true where 
courts have been unclear about what quantum of proof a state must 
produce to meet its burden.  
 
 149. Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. 
 151. These were the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child & 
Adolescent Psychiatry, American Psychological Association, American Medical Association, 
American Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Psychiatric Association. JOINT 
STATEMENTS, supra note 89. 
 152. Id. (“[W]ell over 1000 studies . . . point overwhelmingly to a causal connection 
between media violence and aggressive behavior in some children.”). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. “Some suggest it is only a matter of time before science can meet the exacting 
causation standard that courts currently demand.” Knake, supra note 4, at 1202 (citing Kevin 
W. Saunders, Shielding Children from Violent Video Games Through Ratings Offender Lists, 41 
IND. L. REV. 55, 55 (2008)). 
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Now that Brown has essentially etched in stone constitutional 
disapproval of existing science, it will be increasingly difficult for 
courts to identify the “smoking gun” study when it is published.156 
This judicial inertia, however, predated Brown. To illustrate, consider 
the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Entertainment Software Ass’n v. 
Swanson.157 In stark contrast to the majority of cases that give little 
to no credence to the states’ proferred evidence,158 the Swanson 
court stated that the “State’s evidence provides substantial support” 
for its claim that violent video games harm minors.159 Nevertheless, 
the Swanson court concluded that the state regulation was invalid, 
despite not only the “substantial” evidence, but the state’s “intuitive 
(. . . commonsense) feelings regarding the effect that the extreme 
violence portrayed in [modern] video games may well have upon the 
psychological well-being of minors.”160 This conclusion, 
notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit’s apparent sympathy with state-
proffered evidence, demonstrates the same judicial inertia that will 
likely plague later state attempts to pass strict scrutiny. Bear in mind 
that for many of the lower federal court cases “substantial evidence” 
was, at least nominally, the standard of proof required by strict 
scrutiny. Now that Brown has made clear that a higher standard is 
required, it will be that much harder for regulation proponents to 
pass constitutional muster. Accordingly, because courts appear 
dissatisfied with the body of current research, and considerable 
inertia has already been demonstrated by Brown and lower court 
decisions alike, notwithstanding persuasive evidence of harm, 
regulation proponents will likely continue to come up short. 
C. The Nature of the “Harm to Minors” Rationale and State 
Regulatory Attempts Make Violent Video Game Regulation 
Particularly Infirm in Light of the “Narrowly Tailored” Requirement. 
Courts have quickly dismissed state attempts to show that, 
regardless of the interest at stake, a proposed regulation is narrowly 
 
 156. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011). 
 157. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 158. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097 (W.D. 
Okla. Sept. 17, 2007).  
 159. Swanson, 519 F.3d at 772. 
 160. Id. Indeed, the Swanson court reasoned simply that, although there was substantial 
evidence of a causal link between violent video games and harm to minors, the state had failed 
to show the “incontrovertible proof” required to uphold the statute. 
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tailored to promote that interest.161 Courts typically reject state 
arguments for one or more of the following reasons: (1) the 
proposed statute is “underinclusive” in the sense that it fails to 
“materially advance” the protection of minors because it does not 
address other forms of violent media;162 (2) the regulation is 
overinclusive in that it purports to aid parents in monitoring their 
children’s behavior without demonstrating that parents really want 
or need such help;163 or (3) the government has failed to prove that 
court-suggested, less restrictive alternatives would fail to adequately 
address the alleged problem.164 
Courts’ use of the underinclusiveness rationale presents an 
especially difficult obstacle for regulation opponents given the 
infeasibility of extending government regulation over other forms of 
protected media. Movies have long enjoyed First Amendment 
protection,165 except those qualifying as obscenity.166 Violent movies 
have never been considered obscene.167 While, as one court noted, 
regulation proponents would probably like to argue for more 
restrictions on minors’ access to violent movies,168 the constitutional 
history of movie protection makes this nearly impossible. In 
addition, although at least one court has acknowledged that a state 
seeking to regulate minors’ access to media violence “has to start 
somewhere and should not be discouraged from experimenting,”169 
this sentiment has not been embraced by most courts. This apparent 
requirement—that a state address the whole universe of violent 
media before addressing any of it—presents regulators with a true 
dilemma that will likely doom future state efforts to regulate violent 
video games. Axiomatically, the more restrictive the statute, the less 
 
 161. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741; Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 
F.3d 950, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The State appears to be singularly focused on the ‘most 
effective’ way to further its goal, instead of the ‘least restrictive means,’ and has not shown why 
the less-restrictive means would be ineffective.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740; supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 163. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741. 
 164. Id. at 2740–41. 
 165. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[E]xpression by 
means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 166. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1964).  
 167. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 168. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 169. Id. 
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likely a court will find it “narrowly tailored” and the less likely it is to 
be the “least restrictive means” to advance the stated interest. As 
such, in the violent video game context, it appears that the 
Constitution requires that the regulatory remedy address the harm to 
minors but leaves no room for a solution broad enough to do so. 
In addition to the underinclusiveness issue, federal courts often 
elaborate a number of “less restrictive” means that states could use 
to address harm to minors without the proposed statutes. These 
include: simply allowing the gaming industry to regulate itself 
through voluntary ratings,170 relying on parents to use modern 
parental controls to block mature content on household game 
consoles,171 and an education campaign about the voluntary industry 
ratings.172 Not only does the apparent success of these methods 
hamper state regulatory efforts, the context-specific nuances of child 
psychology, parent preference, and the harm rationale make it 
difficult for states to narrowly tailor a statute to address the 
purported harm. 
Not all video games are created equal in terms of interactivity 
and level of violent content.173 Neither does every child possess an 
equal capacity to conduct and oversee digital carnage while 
remaining emotionally and mentally unscathed. Theoretically, the 
state could absolutely protect children from potential harm caused 
by violent video games by preventing all children from playing them. 
However, such a measure is too blunt an instrument to adequately 
balance constitutional freedoms with the state’s interest in 
preventing harm to individual minors. The “gold standard” of 
government regulation would be to block access to violent video 
games only by those minors most likely to be harmed, and then only 
blocking those games that might be harmful. A statute enforcing 
parental consent before a minor can buy, rent, or have unrestricted 
access to a particular game best fits this standard. Under such a 
statute, a parent, who is or should be174 in the best position to know 
 
 170. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740–41 (2011). 
 171. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 965 (9th Cir. 
2009) (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (M.D. La. 2006)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 579–80. 
 174. Justice Scalia argues that the legislature’s normative objective of enforcing the 
parents’ role in regulating their minors’ access to violent video games made the California 
statute “vastly overinclusive.” In Justice Scalia’s view, “[w]hile some of the legislation’s effect 
may indeed be in support of what some parents of the restricted children actually want, its 
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which games, if any, will likely harm their child would be the 
institutional gatekeeper of such content. 
Nevertheless, this is the exact sort of statute that the Court 
struck down in Brown. Further, it seems, as Justice Breyer noted, 
that under a statute such as the one at issue in Brown,175 the relative 
burden to the gaming and retail industry is fairly light.176 In fact, it 
seems likely that codifying,177 or even promoting, the industry’s 
voluntary rating system—a favorite alternative advanced by 
regulation opponents—potentially could be equally or even more 
economically burdensome to retailers. If a parent learns about the 
ratings system, decides to restrict “M-rated” games, and blocks them 
wholesale on the family console, there will be little incentive for the 
children to buy them. Conversely, if children want a game and need 
only convince their parents that the virtues of the game’s “age-old 
themes”178 outweigh its incidental violent content, parents need only 
give their consent or accompany children to the store. This one-time 
burden is in sharp contrast to the burden imposed by other types of 
statutes or proposed alternatives.179 Thus, because statutes like the 
one at issue in Brown appear to be as narrowly tailored as possible, it 
is unlikely that future state regulatory efforts can find a sharper 
instrument.   
 
entire effect is only in support of what the State thinks parents ought to want. This is not the 
narrow tailoring to ‘assisting parents’ that restriction of the First Amendment rights requires.” 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741. 
 175. Id. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 176. Of course, regulation opponents hotly contest this issue. Yet, it is not always clear 
who regulation opponents argue will be burdened. For example, one student author seemed 
concerned that statutes criminalizing the sale of violent video games to minors will actually 
burden the expressive rights of adults. He argued: “[T]he threat of criminal penalties for 
retailers who rent or sell violent video games to minors will undoubtedly cause many retailers 
to stop selling violent video games with an ‘M’ rating. This will prevent adults from renting or 
purchasing such games, unnecessarily limiting their freedom of expression.” Russell Morse, 
Note & Comment, If You Fail, Try, Try Again: The Fate of New Legislation Curbing Minors’ 
Access to Violent and Sexually Explicit Video Games, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 171, 197 
(2005/2006). The main problem with this argument is that it seems unlikely that vendors 
would stop selling video games simply because they cannot sell them to children. Many stores 
sell cigarettes, even though they are much more strictly regulated than video games would be 
under these statutes.  
 177. See Phillips, supra note 106, at 606–07 (arguing that the solution to the violent 
video game problem should be industry classification enforced by local legislation). 
 178. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577–78. 
 179. One example is the City ordinance at issue in Kendrick which required a parent to 
accompany the child any time the child wanted to play at a video arcade. Id. at 579. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The deck is already definitively stacked against state regulators 
trying to restrict minors’ access to violent video games. The only 
questions remaining are (1) whether future developments in 
technology will ever warrant a court’s review of a violent video game 
regulation with anything less than strict scrutiny; and (2) whether a 
state regulation will ever pass strict scrutiny. Although not squarely 
answered by the Brown Court, Brown, read in conjunction with 
earlier cases, demonstrates that both questions must be answered in 
the negative. Courts have been wholly unsympathetic to the 
proposition that a video game could be realistic or interactive 
enough to warrant anything less than full First Amendment 
protection. As to the second question posited above, violent video 
game regulation is unlikely to ever withstand the rigors of strict 
scrutiny. Judicial skepticism and inertia work against future 
regulatory efforts. Further, the nuances of child psychology and the 
states’ harm rationale make proof difficult and make regulation 
susceptible (at least in the eyes of some) to being over or 
underinclusive. Thus, notwithstanding the staunch public opposition 
to games like Manhunt and Postal II, the message from the Supreme 
Court is clear: The game is on. 
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